# AFF Card Doc---Kentucky RR---Race Two

## Manufacturing ADV

### Manufacturing ADV---1AC

#### Advantage one is MANUFACTURING:

#### Manufacturing is on the brink---revitalization key to restoring US innovation and competitive edge.

William B. Bonvillian 25, Lecturer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, teaching courses on innovation and on science and technology policy, Senior Director at MIT’s Office of Open Learning, JD from Columbia, M.A.R from Yale, “Restoring U.S. Leadership In Manufacturing”, January 3rd, 2025, https://fas.org/publication/restoring-u-s-leadership-in-manufacturing/, DOA: 3/7/25, Rslish

Manufacturing is a critical sector for American economic well-being. The value chains in the American economy that rely on manufactured goods account for 25% of employment, over 40% of gross domestic product (GDP), and almost 80% of research and development (R&D) spending in the United States. Yet U.S. leadership in manufacturing is eroding. U.S. manufacturing employment plummeted by one-third—and 60,000 U.S. factories were closed—between 2000 and 2010 (Bonvillian and Singer, Advanced Manufacturing: The New American Innovation Policies, MIT Press, 2018, 52, 265.) Only some 18% of the production jobs lost in the United States during the Great Recession were recovered in the following decade, and production output only returned to its pre–Great Recession levels in 2018. This hollowing out of U.S. manufacturing has been largely driven by international competition, particularly from China. China passed the United States in 2011 as the largest global manufacturing power in both output and value added. The nations have literally traded places: China now has 31% of world manufacturing output while the U.S. has dropped to 16%. The U.S. has not just lost leadership in low-price commodity goods: As part of its massive trade deficit in 2023 of $733 billion in overall manufactured goods, the U.S. ran a deficit of $218 billion in advanced technology goods.

Declining U.S. manufacturing has sharply curtailed a key path to the middle class for those with high school educations or less, thereby exacerbating income inequality nationwide. As a country, we are increasingly leaving a large part of our working class behind an ever-advancing upper middle class. The problems plaguing the domestic manufacturing sector are multifold: American manufacturing productivity is historically low; the supporting ecosystem for small and midsized manufacturers has thinned out so they are slow to adopt process and technology innovations; manufacturing firms lack access to financing when they seek to scale up production for new innovations; manufacturing is poorly supported by our workforce-education system; and we have disconnected our innovation system from our production systems.

The United States can address many of these problems through concerted efforts in advanced manufacturing. Advanced manufacturing means introducing new production technologies and processes to significantly lower production costs and raise efficiency. This would reposition the United States to better compete internationally. Advanced manufacturing also requires that we reconnect innovation with production. A milestone in advanced manufacturing came in 2012, when the federal government established the first of 17 Advanced Manufacturing Institutes with two more planned. Each institute in this network is organized around developing new advanced technologies, from 3D printing to digital production to biofabrication. Each also represents a collaboration among industry, government, and academic institutions. Three federal agencies invest a total of approximately $200 million per year in the institutes—an amount matched by industry and states.

#### Manufacturing is the lynchpin for readiness and deterrence, decline sparks regional conflicts.

Patrick O’Brien et al. 25, Ph.D., former Marine Corps infantry officer; Chip E. Miller, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Marketing, Drake University; George Duchak, Ph.D., Senior Advisor, The Roosevelt Group; Col. Brian Cook, M.S. in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, Director of Theater Strategy, US Army War College; Col. Jay Miseli, M.S. in Operations Research; John Flanagan, M.S. in National Security Studies from Naval War College, “Logistics Gray Swan: History Mocks U.S. Readiness,” Marine Corps University Press, 07/18/2025, <https://doi.org/10.36304/ExpwMCUP.2025.07>. HB [DoIB = dynamic domestic industrial base]

In addition to the logistics inventory approaches mentioned above, the United States today faces the broadest range of conflicts by type, temporal, technological, and geographic scope—outside of an active world war—in its history. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, identifies additional perils.14 These include the rise of China as a global military and economic power; Russia’s ties with China, Iran, and North Korea and its goal of reducing U.S. influence globally by applying military intimidation and leveraging its energy reserves; India’s rise as a major secondary player seemingly aligned with both the United States and Russia as well as its challenges with neighboring Pakistan; a dangerously unstable nuclear power in North Korea; Iran’s nuclear and regional hegemonic desires in the Middle East; widespread terrorism; invisible cyber attackers; and crime syndicates able to coerce or topple governments.15 Individually, these perils strain the United States’ military preparedness, and a simultaneous realization of multiple threats would arguably overwhelm the nation’s warmaking and defensive capabilities.

U.S. statecraft exerts influence by applying diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers to protect vital interests. While the use of conventional weapons by the United States has generally had a deterrent effect on its adversaries, during the past three years more than 40 articles have illuminated the substantial logistical challenges within the U.S. military and the DIB that undermine this ability to prevent conflict. Some DOD officials argue that the United States should have a military deterrent presence across all warfighting domains and the full spectrum of conflict.16 This deterrent effort puts the United States and its allies in a position to avoid economic insecurity or even armed conflict. National security and economic security are two sides of the same coin. The United States requires both a military and the defense infrastructure that supports it to function together as a successful deterrent to aggressors, prevent interdictions of world trade, and supply friendly nations with the means to repel attackers with or without the direct involvement of U.S. troops. The two goals of maintaining a strong economy and strong military are mutually supporting.

While the current administration of U.S. president Donald J. Trump is enhancing the readiness of the military, the larger DoIB must also be strong, productive, and highly innovative to develop a variety of multiuse hightechnology capabilities to support the DIB and DOD. Indeed, multiple authors argue that current administration initiatives are very helpful. The United States needs to repair its military infrastructure to regain “great power” supremacy. Christian Brose suggests in The Kill Chain that key changes for future military readiness are necessary.17 Authors such as Jerry Hendrix, A. Wess Mitchell, and Ionut C. Pop have also written about great power challenges.18 Currently, personnel shortages, heavily used or outdated equipment, and increased operational tempos all contribute to a lower readiness posture that affects the U.S. military’s great power capabilities.

One critical reason to maintain the readiness of the U.S. military with a JIC model is the global interconnectedness of the modern world. For example, a major suspension of the flow of petroleum or a refusal to sell vital raw materials could severely damage economies around the globe. Stable energy supplies and critical REE and other key metals are vital for modern manufacturing, modern economies, continued innovation, and skilled workforces. For these reasons alone, business deals may not be sufficient to maintain stability. The power to protect the nation and the flow of goods is essential for the continued economic growth of the United States and the world. Most recently, this was evidenced by the U.S. Navy deploying forces to the Red Sea to maintain free passage of shipping, benefiting Europe and Asia. This is also, however, an example of a conflict that is contributing to the strain on the supply of U.S. munitions.

For the United States to maintain its great power status, to remain at the forefront of technology, and to be self-reliant, many industries are essential for ensuring a strong military. These industries include shipbuilding, aviation, space technology, computer technology, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, quantum computing and communications, cybersecurity, and superior dual-use consumer goods. Being a leader in these and other critical industries requires a heightened sense of national urgency. In the past, research demands by the military have often been at the center of advances in these areas, but this has lagged in recent decades. U.S. capacity in many areas is also challenged and strained. Examples include shipbuilding and repairs (particularly for the U.S. Navy), low-cost long-range missiles, antiship cruise missiles, and advanced manufacturing of artillery munitions. A significant facet of the United States’ postwar strategy for peace and economic growth following the end of the Cold War was to build up other countries’ industrial capabilities and capacity, often at the expense of U.S. selfreliance. An unintended consequence for the U.S. military has been a slow, steadily upward trend in reliance on imports for key materials and production capability

#### Rebuilding the domestic industrial commons is necessary to counteract multiple existential risks.

Dr. Richard Haass 20, Master’s and Doctorate of Philosophy Degrees from Oxford University, Former Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State, Veteran Diplomat Under 4 Presidential Administrations, Awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal, Rhodes Scholar, “International Relations In The COVID-19 Era: Richard Haass On What Comes After A Pandemic”, Interview with Meghna Chakrabarti and Jack Beatty on NPR’s On Point, 4/22/2020, <https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2020/04/22/international-relations-coronavirus-richard-haass> [Transcribed by Otter.ai, Grammatical transcription edits by Casey Harrigan]

So suddenly, the world is being left on its own. And what we're seeing is the world is not on autopilot. It doesn't self-organize. And that's the most worrisome thing going forward that this pandemic is both a reflection, but also an accelerant of that because the United States has not rallied the world to meet the challenge posed by this pandemic. And instead, we've pulled back we become much more national, kind of an island power, the rest of the world, it's on its own, it's not doing very well. And this is this is the reason I'm so worried that a lot of the trends that were in place, including them on America, much less involved in the world, nationalism, populism, the breakdown of international collaboration, all those things were in train before this pandemic, and now we're seeing them double down.

MEGHNA: So is the you're saying the world is not self-organizing right now, perhaps, at this moment? And at the same time, it doesn't? Is it feeling the loss of the centrality of American leadership? Because, I think we could argue that the way that, for example, international leaders do talk about the United States right now, at times, they're not necessarily feeling the loss of American influence.

HAASS: Well should I think they're feeling the loss of American leadership in the American example, that they had grown accustomed to your foreign policies about what our diplomats say and do what our military does, but it's also the example we set at home, the quality of our democracy, the strength of our economy, the response say to a pandemic, so they're looking at this United States and a lot of leaders and I speak to them all the time are essentially saying we don't recognize this America. This is not the America we thought we knew. So, they're in a very difficult position where now they have to essentially get on without us. But they don't really have the capability. There's no one who has the power that we have, the influence they we have. So no one can fill our shoes. So everybody's on their own, and no one does better on his or her own than they do, again, in a collective effort where the United States leads, so they're not happy about the situation. They're increasingly reconciled to it. But they very much miss the United States that for decades had help organize the world to meet a whole range of challenges.

MEGHNA: Jack, do you want to respond to that?

BEATTY: Well, I think that's very well said. And sometimes that did lead to overreach I mean, Vietnam, Iraq. But on the other hand, it also led to, you know, arms control treaties and efforts to combat threats to the environment that that stretched across, administration's I, you know, I'm struck with this, and I put it to you, Richard, it's as if, you know, the, the greatest generation ratified their experience, they looked at their experience, and they accepted America's new role in the world. Were a different people today. And it's inconceivable that in the post war, someone like Donald Trump could have gotten within, you know, hailing distance of the presidency just wouldn't have happened. For one thing, he wasn't a veteran. And I was just gonna say, the people that voted for Trump or no, go vote for him again, and then not voting for anything like the foreign policy, the security policy, that the times demand, and that our past has mandated. They're the people who feel left behind from the post-Cold War world of globalization and so on. And they're still there. They're a different people from those after World War Two

MEGHNA: Jack, if I just can just dovetail what you're saying. And then Richard I’ll, off back to you. I would actually say that that is not limited to the supporters of the President, that there is, in a sense amongst people a bipartisan agreement about feeling left behind, it's just that perhaps their preferred policy angles on how to solve that problem might be different. But your point is, is well taken, jack and, Richard, you want to respond to that? So go ahead.

HAASS: No, absolutely. I think it's exactly right. And it's really interesting to ask, why is this the case? And I think you're right Meghna, it is bipartisan, it crosses party lines. I think there's a sense that foreign policy has costs more than its benefited us people look at Iraq, they look at the World War, also in Afghanistan. And they simply, correctly I would say, don't think in any way either was worth it. These issues are not taught in our schools, or if they are taught, they're not required. So, you can graduate from Harvard, or Stanford or Princeton, and have no background whatsoever in international relations or in history. Our media, for the most part doesn't cover these issues. Over the last 20-30 years, there's been a real reduction in the degree of international coverage. So, most Americans simply don't see the connection between what goes on in the world and what goes on here in the United States.

So, you know, here was this place called Wuhan where a virus broke out. And what we've learned in an extraordinarily expensive way, is that nothing stays local for long. What happens in Wuhan doesn't stay in Wuhan, but it travels. And this has cost us trillions of dollars. And already what more than 40,000 lives and the toll keeps mounting by the hour. This is an expensive lesson in why isolationism is not an option in a global world. And the real question is, will we learn that lesson? Will we learn the right lesson? Will we basically say we have got to get more involved in the world to prepare for the next pandemic? To do something about climate change? To do something about structuring the world, the digital world so it's positive and not negative? Are we still going to deal say with the threat of terrorism or proliferation? The real question, for me, is coming out of this, do we have the bandwidth Do we have the resources to have we learned the lesson that we can't isolate ourselves from what goes on in the world and to do that safely?

MEGHNA: I think that's a good question, Richard, because it seems to me that for there's a generation of Americans out there who most often see the effects of US foreign policy through the instruments of failed wars. I'm just going to put it like that. There have not been enough examples of the positive benefits of American foreign policy or American leaders and that is part of what is causing people to doubt right now. And on that point, I would like to actually take a caller who has something to say about this. So let's go to Jeremy, who's calling from Racine, Wisconsin. Jeremy, what's your thoughts?

JEREMY: Alright, thanks for taking my call. I believe that we're coming into a point in our history. That is it's more of like an institutional crisis within our government and its inability to function with each other to have a clear intent, and to come together with all the resources to accomplish that. That intent clearly and to our desirable outcomes, given the fact what we did in Afghanistan and Iraq. We went in Iraq, we hosted Saddam Hussein, and then we kind of sat around and said, “now what”?. We just wasted incredible amount of lives, resources and money to to exert our foreign policy in an inefficient way. We just we have to restructure how we go about our foreign policy, how do we interact with other nations, instead of sending the big stick every time something goes wrong, we need to start working on better diplomacy and things like that. And Donald Trump is probably what I would consider, he is like, the fox in the henhouse. The American people just sent him into the henhouse, and he's just wreaking havoc all over the federal government. And that's pretty much what a lot of people feel right now. They just are tired with inability to come together and actually fix something and make it coherent, that everybody can understand. Yeah.

MEGHNA: Well, Jeremy, thank you for that thought. Richard Haass, did you want to respond to him?

HAASS: Sure. Let me react to Jeremy. I think he's right, that we've overused the military tool, and we've underused other tools, including diplomacy, foreign aid, and so forth. He points to the dangers of overreach in Iraq, Afghanistan, Jack before mentioned Vietnam, but I also think there's a real danger of underreach of the United States does too little. And you said Meghna, that people don't see the benefits. Well, think about it, the first half of the century, we had two enormous world wars, when the United States was detached from the world. We've avoided a world war between or among the great powers for the last 75 years, in large part because the United States has been involved. We've seen an enormous growth in the number of people who live in democracies and the degree of freedom. We've seen enormous improvements in the standard of living and the extension of lifespans. So, the last 70-75 years have actually been the most successful era of human history ever. Ever.

MEGHNA: Some would say it's anomalous. Yeah. Someone say it's an anomalous 70 years.

HAASS: Well, that's, to me, that's the big question. Were the last 70-75 years? Or are they the Can we make them the new normal? Can we extend them? Or did they become something of an aberration? And do we go back to the kind of world that for centuries before were we you know, that was the norm, World War One, World War Two constant wars in Europe? And that's where we are I actually think we're at one of those crossroads in history. And the issue for us. Another way to think about it: are we the United States, after World War One that's going to retreat from the world and let it and let it unravel? Or are we the United States after World War Two, that's going to have a creative surge, and try to restructure the world to deal with the challenges of this generation? And I think that is the fundamental question.

MEGHNA: And it is a very compelling one. Jack, did you do you have some I know, you have some thoughts on that?

BEATTY: Well, I mean, that frames it will weigh and, and, you know, to be more specific will the election, even touch on this, you know, in in 2016, we had a Secretary of State running for president and she lost to a man who said, I know more about war than the generals and I alone can fix it. And I get my ideas about foreign policy from the Sunday shows. That showed what at least, you know, a decisive Electoral College majority thought about foreign policy. And Trump isn't going to run as the leader of the free world. He's going to run as ‘America First’, ‘America alone’, ‘America, The Wall’ is his metaphor. And I don't see how it keeps out. dizzy, but nevermind. In other words, that's going to be on the ballot and America's role in the world and his will Joe Biden who you know, can seem like yesterday's man in so many ways. Will Joe Biden rise to that and say no, even though it's difficult for Americans in theu may have to spend money in foreign places to deal with threats. We have to do it. Will he argue that it will he just simply let Trump American first carry that.

MEGHNA: Well, when we come back, we're going to talk about what the possibilities are in this moment. So Richard Haass and Jack Beatty standby for just a moment. This is On Point.

MEGHNA: This is On Point. I'm Meghna Chakrabarti, we're talking with Richard Haass. He's President of the Council on Foreign Relations. He's also a veteran diplomat who served under four presidents. His recent essay in Foreign Affairs magazine is headlined, The Pandemic Will Accelerate History, Rather Than Reshape It. And we have a link to it at onpointradio.org. He has a forthcoming book due out in May called *The World A Brief Introduction*. And Jack Beatty On Point news analyst joins us as well. Richard, I wanted to talk with you and Jack about, you know about specific possibilities also that present themselves in this moment, and let's get very granular. I mean, let's talk about North Korea right now. Because even in the midst of this pandemic, we could be at a turning point there with, you know, questions around the health of Kim Jong Un. I mean, is the US positioned right now to take advantage of whatever possibility might be emerging on the Korean peninsula?

HAASS: Well, you're right. Anytime there's a crisis there, there are inevitably possibilities. One obvious one is in the area of improving global health governance. How do we increase the odds that the next outbreak of a disease does not lead to a global pandemic. In the case of North Korea, it's a little bit hard to read, it's in some ways the most closed country in the world. But, this could lead to a degree of instability, which on one hand, would be threatening, given their dozens of nuclear weapons could lead to significant refugee flows. But it could also, possibly, set in motion trends that would end the division of the Korean Peninsula. This is one of last holdout of the post World War Two situation, you still have a divided peninsula between a closed communist north and a democratic open south. It's the most armed border in the world. So it's just possible that this could set in motion trends. So I would very much hope the United States was talking to the government in Seoul and South Korea, and to Chinese about how we will manage a situation if there is a instability in North Korea. This could become a moment to at a minimum deal with the nuclear challenge in the North, and possibly even the, again, the fundamental division of the Peninsula.

MEGHNA: In fact, you tweeted just yesterday that it's in fact essential for the US, China and South Korea to stay in close contact right now about this?

HAASS: Oh, absolutely. Because you can imagine you have a situation where you suddenly have hundreds of thousands of refugees, going from North Korea, either into South Korea, or into China. China might be tempted to intervene well, so might South Korea, so might the United States. Well, we don't want to have a situation where suddenly you have a chaos and various armies moving forward. So, we've got to manage this at a minimum to avoid a bad situation becoming something incomparably worse. But also to see if we can steer the situation to a lasting outcome that would also be better. This really requires intimate choreography among Beijing, Seoul and Washington.

MEGHNA: But let me ask you, though, honestly, given the trend that you write about in your, in your Foreign Affairs article that we've been watching over the past 15 years or so. Do you have any faith that that cooperation would actually happen?

HAASS: I have very little faith, though, on the ground, the military they are is quite significant. And it's a US/UN force and they are in close touch with the South Koreans. We have some connections to the Chinese, but I worry about it, quite honestly, I'm not gonna sugarcoat it. People are so distracted for good reason. By the COVID-19. The US/Chinese relationship was in bad shape before this crisis, is now in worse shape. The US South Korean relationship hasn't been great. The President has been attacking the alliance trying to get the South Koreans to pay much more. So, I am not sure that we are up to the challenge. And again, North Korea is an extraordinarily difficult country to try to act in simply again, because it's the most shut off from the rest of the world. You know, we're sitting here talking about this and quite honestly, we do not know, either what the health reality is facing the North Korean leader or what, if anything, planning might be in place for succession.

MEGHNA: Right. I also feel like it's a very good example about the choice that you and Jack have been talking about that the United States is on the cusp of having to make about what kind of nation it's going to be because the issue of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula cannot be solved without the direct involvement of the United States and China. So that brings me back to this underlying question. Richard, can you can you imagine, imagine a new model of American national security, a new paradigm of American national security, that doesn't have American primacy on the world stage at its heart?

HAASS: Primacy can be understood as a fact of life or a goal. I don't think our goal ought to be one of primacy. We can't control that, because primacy is about relative strength. Right now, that the United States is still the world's most powerful military, we are the world's largest single economy. But the fact is, for all of our strength, we can't tackle the emerging problems in the world on our own. We can't maintain global health unilaterally, we obviously can't deal with climate change by ourselves. We can't control proliferation or terrorism, or set the rules for cyberspace on our own. So unilateralism, no matter how strong we are, is simply not a viable foreign policy strategy. We have got to partner with others. And the challenge with a country like China is: how do we selectively partner with China, given our profound disagreements, the difference between our systems and the fact that we, for example, have real foreign policy differences, say over the fate of Taiwan. And that that to me, is going to be one of the real foreign policy challenges going forward.

MEGHNA: Jack, did you want to respond to that?

BEATTY: Undoubtedly, it is going to be but you know, look at it. I mean, one of the one of the faults, I think of the of the current administration is the President sees things in a zero sum way, you know, we win, they lose even his view of trade, which is, you know, since Adam Smith, we accept that it's, you know, when comparative advantage and all that he sees that as No, I win, you lose, he was talking about the trade deficit with China just yesterday, and he said, Look, they ripped us off. They didn't rip us off. We got all that cheap goods that we wanted from China. That's, that's called trick, he doesn't seem to understand that basic fundamental of, of international economy. And he doesn't seem to, to look at foreign relations that way, either. Although you have to give him a lot of credit for trying to warm relations with North Korea at the top.

MEGHNA: Well, Richard, I wonder: it sounds like you are lamenting the death of a sort of liberal world order that, as you pointed out, the United States has been the beneficiary of and the leader of for the past 75 years. But if you had a magic wand, and you could you could wave it over Planet Earth right now, what would you change? I guess what I'm asking you is what would you do to, to set up the United States of the global community for success, as we come through this pandemic?

HAASS: I would look in two directions. Domestically, I would try to make the case to Americans about why foreign policy was in our national interest, why our involvement in the world would improve the quality of life here at home. At the same time, we would also need to attend to our many challenges and shortcomings here at home. I once wrote a book called Foreign Policy Begins At Home. And the whole idea was we needed to establish a greater domestic base if we were going to be capable of acting in the world and Americans were going to be willing to support it. I also made clear something the President might have missed in the book was the argument that foreign policy doesn't end at home, we've got to stay involved in the world. It's we now circling back to where we began the conversation. We've got to take into account this new global agenda and we've got to we've got to figure out how to narrow the gap between these emerging global challenges, like global health, like climate change, like terrorism, like proliferation, and global arrangements. One of the phrases you constantly hear from people in my businesses international community. Well, the fact is, there isn't one. And our goal should be to better build one where we take into account this newest security agenda. So that's what I would focus on, I wouldn't let go of the old agenda. I'm still worried about Russia, what they're doing in Europe. I'm worried about Iran. I'm worried about North Korea, worried to some extent about China. But I would put much greater emphasis on building global arrangements to deal with this new set of challenges that, as we've seen over the last few months, has the ability to fundamentally turn life here upside down.

MEGHNA: Okay, so that makes me wonder you had said earlier that what has changed is the United States and that the sheen, or the shine of America's example to the world is no longer there. And I would think that Americans admit many Americans themselves also feel it because their lives are difficult. So could we achieve is a central part of achieving the vision you just laid out. Richard is actually focusing here at home that if we if we rebuild the American example of democracy, then it shows that perhaps these the more authoritarian leaders who are who are on the rise now, it once again shows them as the example that you don't want to follow.

HAASS: The answer is yes, but. Yes, we need to improve the functioning of our political system, particularly in Washington. It works better at the state and local level in many cases. We’ve obviously got to provide more of a safety net for more of our citizens. Infrastructure has to be better. The kind of response we’ve had to this pandemic shows so many of our shortfalls. So, yes, there are lots of things we have to do at home.

#### BUT the AFF solves by strengthening unions and collective bargaining rights, unleashing the innovation and competitiveness needed to reinvigorate manufacturing.

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Despite the hold-up hypothesis, Bhuller et al. (2022) argue that firms' investment decisions may be determined by the degree of centralization of collective bargaining. Centralise bargaining processes seem to favour innovative firms by setting labour costs common to all firms, benefiting those that manage to increase productivity. On the other hand, local bargaining allows unions greater ability to negotiate wages according to the value added of firms, increasing labour costs and reducing the incentive to innovate. ‘Collective industry bargaining is expected to lead to a modernized industry with high average productivity and an egalitarian wage distribution across firms. Local bargaining should lead to a less modernized industry with a somewhat lower average productivity and with a more inegalitarian wage distribution’ (Bhuller et al., 2022: 40).

Nevertheless, this result changes if both parties behave like the McDonald and Solow (1981) ‘efficient innovation’ model and the ‘companies' strategic investment’ games models (Bond & Van Reenen, 2002), in which companies invest to maintain or gain market shares, faced with the threat of entry by new competitors and a potential loss of market power and profits (efficiency effect). These models of strategic games of company behaviour highlight the importance of the market structure in the investment decision, particularly in R&D (Menezes-Filho & Van Reenen, 2003). In these models, the effect of the unions on investment depends on its preference between employment and wages. **A risk-averse union will prefer employment to wages and, in such a situation, the effect of an increase in union power is to increase employment and, therefore, company investment. This gain in market share encourages investment, including in R&D, due to the threat of new entries.** Empirical literature has found support for this prediction (Menezes-Filho et al., 1998).

Moreover, considering that (i) innovative companies are those showing higher productivity and (ii) **collective bargaining could increase productivity and investment in new technology** (Brandl & Braakmann, 2021; Cahuc et al., 2014), by promoting voice and participation, unions can also stimulate companies to invest in TI- and firm-specific human capital (Bryson et al., 2005; Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Unions can also play an essential role in the effects of the introduction of innovative practices in companies. This effect will depend on the bargaining capacity of the unions and also on their ability to negotiate. Following the analysis taken by Bryson et al. (2005), a strong union can bargain the nature of investment and innovation in the workplace, blocking those attempts that may have the most negative effects for its members or may even make them more acceptable to both the company and its affiliates. **They can bargain, for example initiatives like job security guarantors and high wages in return for productivity-enhancing innovation** (Freeman & Medoff, 1984).

In this way, Freeman and Medoff (1984) show that the search for benefits for workers by unions also benefits companies and, therefore, stimulates their growth, investment and competitiveness. In the process of generating benefits for workers, they favour job retention, reducing search and training costs. On the contrary, they also provide incentives for employers to invest in the company and in the workers (company-specific human capital).

Bhuller et al. (2022) and Haucap and Wey (2004) show theoretically that **top-level bargaining favours investment in innovative firms by generating lower relative production costs compared to non-innovative firms;** on the contrary, individual bargaining eliminates this relative cost advantage by setting wages according to the value added of firms (as the wage differential between firms increases, the profit of the innovative firm decreases). **In other words: ‘Industry bargaining,** in contrast, **works as a tax on the least productive units and as a subsidy on the most productive.** In this case, firms have incentives to invest more in modern technologies and in scrapping the old ones at an earlier stage’ (Bhuller et al., 2022: 40).

Brandl (2022) refers to it as a cartelizing effect, where the homogenisation of wages and working conditions prevents companies from using wage reduction or working conditions as a competitive strategy. Therefore, higher level collective agreements and coordination encourage companies to increase their competitiveness through innovation or adoption of new technologies, rather than reducing labour costs. This argument matches in part with that of duopoly models. Duopoly models generally conclude that centralization of collective bargaining favours innovation by more innovative, or more competitive, firms; as opposed to individual bargaining (Basak & Mukherjee, 2018). The innovation decision of the collectively bargained firm is related to market structure. Individual bargaining introduces higher transaction costs (Willman et al., 2004), and confirms the hypothesis of Bhuller et al. (2022). On the other hand, Haucap and Wey (2004) show that the benefits of innovation are higher for a highly productive firm when bargaining is centralised versus individual; both for process innovation and for job creation and employment.

As shown by Willman et al. (2004), following transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1981), unions reduce transaction costs in two ways, by providing an agency role for the employer, enforcing and monitoring contracts and improving information flows; by reducing the transaction costs faced by employers by assisting them in their management functions.

#### Independently, domestic manufacturing is key to supply chain resiliency.

Wimalaratana Wijitapure & Hema Senanayak 24, Ph.D. from Radboud University, Professor Emeritus, University of Colombo; Ph.D. student in economics, University of Colombo, “Revitalizing America's Industrial Heart: A Multi-Pronged Approach to Reindustrialization,” Sri Lanka Economic Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1, June 2025, pg. 64-86, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392853452\_Revitalizing\_America's\_Industrial\_Heart\_A\_Multi-Pronged\_Approach\_to\_Reindustrialization. HB

A critical lesson from recent global events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions, is the vulnerability of global supply chains. A successful reindustrialization strategy must focus on rebuilding domestic supply chains to ensure that key materials and products are sourced locally or from reliable, nearby partners.

Reshoring Production: Encouraging companies to reshore production facilities or source raw materials from domestic suppliers can reduce dependence on global supply chains, particularly for critical industries like semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment. This not only helps in securing national interests but also creates jobs and stimulates economic growth domestically.

Development of Key Industries: Certain industries are essential for national security and economic resilience. These include sectors like electronics, defence, medical equipment, and energy. Government policies, such as tax incentives, research grants, and subsidies, can help spur the growth of these industries domestically, reducing dependence on foreign imports and strengthening supply chain resilience. Regional

Manufacturing Hubs: Creating regional manufacturing hubs or clusters, where related industries are co-located, can help streamline supply chains. These hubs encourage collaboration between companies, reduce transportation costs, and foster innovation. Examples like Silicon Valley in technology or Detroit in automotive manufacturing demonstrate the benefits of concentrated industrial activity. By ensuring that critical industries and supply chains are localized, the U.S. can better protect itself from external shocks while promoting job creation and economic stability.

#### Continuous reliance on global supply chains magnifies cascading shocks, amplifying resource disruptions into systemic collapse.

Sean ÓhÉigeartaigh 25, Ph.D. from Trinity College Dublin, Associate Director for AI: Futures & Responsibility programme, Center for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge, “Extinction of the Human Species: What could cause it and how likely is it to occur?”, 03/07/2025, DOA: 8/21/25, https://doi.org/10.1017/ext.2025.4, Rslish

Multiplicative stresses and civilisational vulnerability

A common theme across many of the risks discussed is that they may cause global catastrophe but are unlikely to wipe out the human species in isolation. However, it is realistic to expect that some catastrophes may trigger further catastrophic consequences across the categories above or otherwise occur in combination. The severity of some past major mass extinctions likely resulted from reinforcing interactions between multiple stresses, some playing out over thousands of years. The Permo-Triassic saw a cascade of global warming, ocean acidification and anoxia, and methane and hydrogen release Bond and Grasby (2017). The Cretaceous-Paleogene saw the catastrophic consequences of the Chixhulub impact devastating a global environment already stressed by the Deccan Traps (Keller, 2012).

Returning to modern times and shorter timescales, Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that “it is the interconnections of stresses and the way we respond to environmental shocks that promulgates the greatest existential risk.”. Rees (2003) draws attention to the fragile nature of global supply chains: a catastrophe that resulted in higher order impacts, such as disruption of power and food supply chains, would quickly render cities uninhabitable. A civilisation reeling from one catastrophe might also be less resilient to further threats: a planet reeling from nuclear war may not be able to muster the resources to embark on a project to divert an asteroid. Nonetheless, total human extinction remains a very high bar, even for multiple of these threats in combination.

Analysing overall civilisational vulnerability and higher-order impacts of global-scale catastrophes is challenging. There is growing work in this direction. Baum and Handoh (2014) propose a “Boundary Risk for Humanity and Nature” framework that combines concepts from global catastrophic risk and the planetary boundaries framework. This intersection is further explored in studies addressing the relationship between the sustainable development goals and existential risk (Cernev and Fenner, 2020) and the role of planetary boundary breach in global catastrophe scenarios (Cernev, 2022). Jehn (2023) examines the role of planetary boundary breach in exacerbating or mitigating the cascading impacts of nuclear war.

Liu et al. (2018) present a taxonomy of existential hazards grouped by how global vulnerability and exposure to the hazards plays out. Avin et al. (2018) analyse severe global catastrophic risk mechanisms by critical systems affected, global spread mechanism and prevention and mitigation failure. Cotton-Barratt et al. (2020) propose a three defence layer model against extinction-level catastrophes, focusing on prevention, response and resilience. Kemp et al. (2022) outline a research agenda around climate-triggered catastrophes and societal fragility. Maher and Baum (2013), MacAskill (2022) and Belfield (2023) explore factors that might contribute to either extinction or recovery following a civilisational collapse. Drawing on a range of concepts in systemic risk, Arnscheidt et al. (2024) argue that emergent properties of the global system make important contributions to the risk of global catastrophic outcomes, noting that a focus on hazards in early global catastrophic risk research critically neglects factors such as amplification and vulnerability. Further valuable insights are likely to come from collaboration between existential risk, systemic risk and collapse research. 12

#### The AFF is key---sectoral bargaining is necessary to rebuild the industrial commons, driving growth, and productivity.

Michael Lind 20, professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, master's degree in International Relations from Yale, and JD from University of Texas, “Tripartism, American Style: The Past and Future of Sectoral Policy”, American Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2020, <https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/02/tripartism-american-style-the-past-and-future-of-sectoral-policy/>, DOA: 8/7/25, Rslish

The objective of these sectoral policies in the dynamic oligopoly sector is not to “pick winners” or bestow subsidies on politically favored national champions. Rather, the goal should be to preserve, expand, and upgrade a permanent U.S.-based “industrial commons” in traditional industries like steel and aerospace and automobiles and new industries like robotics and biotech, while providing good jobs for upwardly mobile U.S. citizens and naturalized immigrants. Well-designed sectoral policies can promote national security, national pro­ductivity growth, and inclusive national prosperity all at once.

Sectoral Policy after Neoliberalism

Sectoral policy makes sense. Natural monopolies should be assigned to the oversight of public utility commissions representing major interest groups and viewpoints. At the same time, federal, state, and local governments should play a large role in R&D, technology exten­sion, and public benefits in the low-productivity, low-profit traditional market sector. And within the dynamic oligopoly sector, where manufacturing is found, a new tripartism should be pioneered in strategic industries of military as well as commercial importance, in the emerging global environment of U.S. rivalry with China and other great powers. In both the traditional market sector and the dynamic oligopoly sector, there is ample scope for the relaxation of antitrust laws to permit multiemployer industrial policy and sector-wide col­lective bargaining among representatives of employers and labor.

Notwithstanding the importance of grassroots labor activism, in mid-twentieth-century America unionization flourished chiefly as a side effect of top-down national industrial policy pursued for other means, including war and recovery from the Great Depression. Tri­partite labor-business-government collaboration during World War I and World War II made possible the massive expansion of organized labor and collective bargaining in the mid-twentieth century and the subsequent social peace and widespread prosperity. If working-class Americans are ever again to enjoy the benefits of mass membership labor organizations of some kind, it will probably not be as a re­sponse to grassroots mobilization from below, employer by employer, state by state. More likely, any revival of worker empowerment in the United States will result from a much larger and more comprehensive program of national development carried out by the federal government in the service of military strength and economic growth, a national industrial policy of which institutionalized employer-worker bargaining would be only one of several elements.

#### Econ turns are wrong---Germany proves the effectiveness of sectoral bargaining.

Anis Chowdhury 18, Professor of Economics, University of Western Sydney and is a Senior Economic Affairs Officer in the Office of the Under Secretary General, UN-DESA, PhD, “Industry-Wide Bargaining Good for Efficiency, as Well as Equity”, December 18th, 2018, <https://futurework.org.au/post/industry-wide-bargaining-good-for-efficiency-as-well-as-equity/>, DOA: 7/7/25, Rslish

Mr. Willox’s claim that the sector-wide wage bargaining would destroy jobs and Australia’s competitiveness has no basis. A powerful example is provided by Germany, Europe’s strongest economy. In Germany, wages, hours, and other aspects of working conditions are decided by unions, work councils (organisations complementing unions by representing workers at the firm level in negotiations), and employers’ associations. Collective wage bargaining takes place not at the company or enterprise level but at the industry and regional levels, between unions and employers’ associations. If a company recognises the trade union, all of its workers are effectively covered by the union contract.

Yet, Germany’s competitiveness did not decline. On the contrary, Germany experiences both strong productivity growth and strong wage growth. Despite ongoing real wage improvements, unit labour costs are stable or even declining – further enhancing Germany’s competitiveness.

How is this possible? The answer was given by more than half a century ago by two leading Australian academics – WEG Salter and Eric Russel. By de-linking productivity-based wage increases at the enterprise level and adhering to the industry-wide average productivity-based wage increases, an industry bargaining system raises relative unit labour costs of firms with below-industry-average productivity, thereby forcing them to improve their productivity or else exit the industry. At the same time, firms with above-industry-average productivity enjoy lower unit labour costs, hence higher profit rates for reinvestment. Singapore also used this approach to restructure its industry in the 1980s towards higher value-added activities, with great success.

Trying to compete on the basis of low wages is a recipe for failure. As a matter of fact, low-wage countries typically demonstrate lower productivity; and research by a leading French economist, Edmond Malinvaud, showed that a reduction in the wage rates has a depressing effect on capital intensity. Salter’s research implies that the availability of a growing pool of low paid workers makes firms complacent with regard to innovation and technological or skill upgrading. Other researchers show that under-paid labour provides a way for inefficient producers and obsolete technologies to survive. Firms become caught in a low-level productivity trap from which they have little incentive to escape – a form of Gresham’s Law’ whereby bad labour standards drive out good. The discipline imposed on all firms as a result of negotiated industry-wide wage increases forces all of them to innovate and become more efficient.

### Manufacturing---U---2AC

#### Continuing to decline across the board---anyone who says otherwise is avoiding facing reality

Meghan Ostertag 24, research assistant for economic policy at the Information, bachelor's degree in economics from American University, “The Census Bureau Confirms US Manufacturing Has Declined”, August 9th, 2024, <https://itif.org/publications/2024/08/09/census-bureau-confirms-us-manufacturing-declined/>, DOA: 8/23/25, Rslish

The latest data from the United States Census Bureau (Census Bureau) demonstrates that manufacturing in America is steadily declining. Once the world leader in manufacturing, the U.S. relinquished that title in 2010, now producing $2.4 trillion less than China in manufacturing. Yet, pundits and Washington insiders continue to deny the facts, claiming that all is well in a concerted effort to avoid any blame for globalization.

The comparison of the Census Bureau’s quinquennial manufacturing data from 2002 to 2022 reveals a stark and depressing reality: in just two decades, the number of manufacturing firms fell, jobs diminished, payroll failed to keep pace with national growth, and productivity stalled.

MANUFACTURING FIRMS

Let’s start with the number of manufacturing firms in the U.S., which declined by 21 percent in 20 years(figure 1). This drop accounts for a decrease in firms in every manufacturing sector, labeled according to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS; see table 1), barring the production of food (311), beverages and tobacco (312), and chemicals (325). The clear outlier among the industries displayed in Figure 1 is beverages and tobacco, which has experienced an extraordinary 348 percent growth rate over the past two decades. This growth can be attributed to the spike in popularity of boutique sodas, kombuchas, seltzer waters, and ready-to-drink cocktails.

### Manufacturing---U---1AR

#### Their studies are theoretically and empirically disproven.

Thomas Sablowski 23. Senior fellow for the political economy of globalization at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Ph.D. in political science. "The Inflation Enigma." Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 2/9/2023. rosalux.de/en/news?tx\_news\_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&tx\_news\_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx\_news\_pi1%5Bnews%5D=49901&tx\_news\_pi1%5Bnews\_uid%5D=0&cHash=c6c71e79dca3a83686dd9a3c73ce2686

Do Excessive Wage Rises Cause Inflation?

Another common theory about inflation؅ concerns what is known as the “wage-price spiral”. This theory, advocated by neoclassical economists and Keynesians alike, claims that inflation is caused by an excessive increase in wages: higher wages result in higher production costs, leading to higher prices. In terms of economic policy, it is argued that wage increases must be curbed should they exceed increases in labour productivity. The wage-price spiral premise quite obviously aligns with the interests of capital.

From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear whether, in a competitive economy, companies are even able to transfer rising labour costs onto product prices, or whether falling profit rates are far more the consequence of rising wages. Also unclear is the extent to which companies combat wage increases by using machines to replace the workforce, thereby cutting their wage expenses. Investments in optimization and rationalization could cause increased unemployment, weaken trade unions, and thus curb wage increases. It remains an open question whether the wage-price spiral even exists. In any case, the theory stipulates that only wage increases that exceed productivity growth lead to rising inflation rates. Whether they are more likely to cause profit rates to sink or inflation to rise is likely to depend on the conditions of competition.

While the gas crisis likely influenced inflation in the EU, it is more difficult to trace how the rise in energy prices has affected inflation in the US.

Moreover, here, too, the question of causality is relevant: high nominal wage increases could be a consequence of high inflation rates, rather than their cause. In any case, companies experience higher costs not only due to wage increases, but also from increasing costs for the means of production. This perspective is far more relevant to our current conjecture, especially taking into account the rising prices of energy derived from fossil fuel.

If we take a look at the actual development of wages in Germany,[1] for example we see the nominal wage bill increased by an average of 4.25 percent per year between 2013 and 2019. The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), the most common measure of the inflation rate in the European Union, rose by an average of only 1.15 percent per year during the same period. Real wages, i.e. the difference between nominal wages and the inflation rate, thus increased by more than 3 percent annually. Inflation remained low despite the significant increase in nominal wages.

During the 2020 pandemic, the nominal wage bill decreased by 0.24 percent. The consumer price index (CPI) for Germany increased by 0.4 percent. Employees thus suffered a 0.64-percent decrease in their real wages. In 2021, the nominal wage total increased by 3.5 percent compared with the shrunken baseline of the previous year. Thus, one can say that the increase in nominal wages still lagged behind the wage increases from 2013–2019. However, this was concurrently offset by a 3.2 percent increase in the CPI. In sum, wage earners only saw their purchasing power rise by 0.3 percent.

In 2022, nominal wages grew by 5.5 percent, but the CPI rose by 8.7 percent. This meant that employees suffered an average real wage loss of 3.2 percent. This demonstrates that there is no clear causal link between wage increases and inflation — the wage-price spiral does not exist. Rather, it seems that during certain phases of capitalist development, real wage increases are possible while inflation remains low. In the current phase of accelerated inflation, on the other hand, nominal wage increases have been unable to compensate for the rise in prices, and wage earners have ended up losing considerable purchasing power as a result. Thus, from the perspective of wage earners, what is needed is not lower but higher wage increases to correct the redistribution in favour of capital brought about by recent price increases.

There is another explanation for inflation which still maintains that wages are major drivers of inflation. Rather than pointing to cost pressures on the supply side, this theory emphasizes the pull of demand provoked by rising wages. In other words, an increase in wages would lead to an increase in demand for goods and services, driving up prices. This, however, ignores the fact that rising profits also create demand. If the share of wages in the value product rises, then the share of profits falls, and vice-versa — if the share of profits rises, then the share of wages falls. Prices can only be driven upwards if the combined purchasing power of wages and profits rises — and if production cannot keep up with this rise in purchasing power. The latter seems to be the crux of the matter in explaining the recent wave of inflation.

## Automation DA

### Automation DA---U---2AC

#### Cost barriers are nonexistent---automation is already everywhere

BROADCOM 24, “Artificial Intelligence Is Impacting Everything—Including Workload Automation”, August 26th, 2024, <https://hbr.org/sponsored/2024/08/artificial-intelligence-is-impacting-everything-including-workload-automation>, DOA: 9/3/25, Rslish

Automation is everywhere. The word “automation” may make you think of a factory floor with cost-efficient robotic assembly or e-commerce companies with sophisticated operations for massive fulfillment centers.

A whole other realm of automation, known as workload automation (WLA), goes mostly unseen. Retailers use WLA to track and update inventory data across physical and online stores. A brokerage may use WLA to reconcile its daily financial transactions prior to the start of market trading. For large organizations, WLA is crucial for employee payroll, customer billing, customer onboarding, employee onboarding, and so forth. The list is endless.

WLA has long been integral to core business processes, enabling businesses to operate on schedule, orchestrate complex workflows, and enhance audit and compliance with centralized controls. WLA is pivotal for scaling enterprise automation that is essential to digital business operations—what can be automated will be automated.

Enter artificial intelligence (AI) to the automation landscape.

As AI takes its place in the portfolio of critical enterprise technologies, the symbiotic nature of AI and WLA can lead to greater business results when their strengths are combined.

An Enterprise Workhorse of a Different Color

Automation tools are common in today’s enterprise. Many have emerged in recent years to meet new and improved processes, such as robotic process automation, business process automation, and workflow automation. Their descriptions are often similar to that of WLA, but their scope is limited to specific domains and use cases.

### Automation DA---U---1AR

#### Err AFF their evidence is based on a single study done at a bakery???

Thompson et al. 24 <Kentucky Blue> – Director of the FutureTech Project, MIT. Ph.D., Business & Public Policy, UC-Berkeley. M.A., Economics, London School of Economics. Neil Thompson, Maja S. Svanberg, M.S. of Technology & Policy at MIT, Wensu Li, Ph.D. candidate in Economics at UConn, Martin Fleming, Research Scientist at MIT Sloan, Brian C. Goehring, A.B. in Cognitive Studies and Philosophy from Princeton, 02-08-2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4700751

A simple hypothetical example makes clear why these considerations are so important. Consider a small bakery evaluating whether to automate with computer vision. One task that bakers do is to visually check their ingredients to ensure they are of sufficient quality (e.g. unspoiled). This task could theoretically be replaced with a computer vision system by adding a camera and training the system to detect food that has gone bad. Even if this visual inspection task could be separated from other parts of the production process, would it be cost effective to do so? Bureau of Labor Statistics O\*NET data imply that checking food quality comprises roughly 6% of the duties of a baker. A small bakery with five bakers making typical salaries ($48,000 each per year), thus has potential labor savings from automating this task of $14,000 per year. This amount is far less than the cost of developing, deploying and maintaining a computer vision system and so we would conclude that it is not economical to substitute human labor with an AI system at this bakery.

#### And they have conveniently highlighted it---neg evidence doesn’t say AI adoption gradual, but rather the effects on labor is

Thompson et al. 24 <Kentucky Blue> – Director of the FutureTech Project, MIT. Ph.D., Business & Public Policy, UC-Berkeley. M.A., Economics, London School of Economics. Neil Thompson, Maja S. Svanberg, M.S. of Technology & Policy at MIT, Wensu Li, Ph.D. candidate in Economics at UConn, Martin Fleming, Research Scientist at MIT Sloan, Brian C. Goehring, A.B. in Cognitive Studies and Philosophy from Princeton, 02-08-2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4700751

The conclusion from this example, that human workers are more economically-attractive for firms (particularly those without scale), turns out to be widespread. We find that only 23% of worker compensation “exposed” to AI computer vision would be cost-effective for firms to automate because of the large upfront costs of AI systems. The economics of AI can be made more attractive, either through decreases in the cost of deployments or by increasing the scale at which deployments are made, for example by rolling-out AI-as-a-service platforms (Borge 2022), which we also explore. Overall, our model shows that the job loss from AI computer vision, even just within the set of vision tasks, will be smaller than the existing job churn seen in the market, suggesting that labor replacement will be more gradual than abrupt.

#### Companies are rapidly expanding automation, now, but It creates jobs ensuring backlash is minimal.

Mark Talmage-Rostron 25 Content Manager Europe at SolarEdge Technologies. “How will Artificial Intelligence will Change the World,” Nexford University, 6-29-2025, https://www.nexford.edu/insights/how-will-ai-affect-jobs, doa: 9-7-25, lmc

Artificial intelligence (AI) could replace the equivalent of 300 million full-time jobs, a report by investment bank Goldman Sachs says. It could replace a quarter of work tasks in the US and Europe but may also mean new jobs and a productivity boom.

And it could eventually increase the total annual value of goods and services produced globally by 7%. The report also predicts two-thirds of jobs in the U.S. and Europe “are exposed to some degree of AI automation,” and around a quarter of all jobs could be performed by AI entirely.

Researchers from the University of Pennsylvania and OpenAI found some educated white-collar workers earning up to $80,000 a year are the most likely to be affected by workforce automation.

Forbes also says that According to an MIT and Boston University report, AI will replace as many as two million manufacturing workers by 2025.

A study by the McKinsey Global Institute reports that by 2030, at least 14% of employees globally could need to change their careers due to digitization, robotics, and AI advancements

### Automation---Link D---2AC

#### Automation can’t replace humans---empirics prove.

Kalena Thomhave 24, Independent Journalist & Researcher, MPP from Michigan University, and a BA in political science from Louisiana state university, “Why the UAW deal may not result in more automation”, February 13th, 2024, <https://www.automotivedive.com/news/uaw-labor-agreement-manufacturing-automation-robots-ford-motor/706637/#:~:text=Robots%20are%20often%20too%20expensive%20to%20replace%20humans&text=Labor%20costs%20had%20increased%20for,for%20some%20tasks%2C%20Hearsch%20said>., DOA: 9/4/25, Rslish

Reducing bodily stress may also allow autoworkers to delay retirement and, in turn, allow automakers to pay them to assemble vehicles rather than fund their retirement benefits, at least for a few more years, Wheaton said.

Automation works best when companies use it to make work easier, not when they try to replace employees with robots, Wheaton said.

Wheaton pointed to Tesla as a cautionary tale, noting that the automaker installed too many robots at its assembly plant in Fremont, California, in 2018 and had to stop production for a week before adding new human workers, according to the Los Angeles Times.

CEO Elon Musk had previously said he wanted the factory to have so few humans that it looked like an “alien dreadnaught.” He later admitted that “humans are underrated.”

#### Sectoral bargaining standardizes labor relations eliminating firms desire to undercut workers and unions.

Oren Cass 21, founder and chief economist of American Compass and holds a J.D. from Harvard Law, “A Better Bargain: Worker Power in the Labor Market”, September 2021, <https://americancompass.org/a-better-bargain-worker-power-in-the-labor-market/>, DOA: 6/9/25, Rslish

The alternative model, much more common in Europe, is called sectoral or broad-based bargaining. In this model, unions represent workers of common interest regardless of their place of employment—generally across an entire occupation, industry, or region. These unions bargain with trade groups representing all of the relevant employers, reaching agreements that apply broadly. In many respects, these agreements are closer to regulations governing industries than to contracts governing workplaces; but unlike regulations, they are chosen by the participants themselves rather than by bureaucrats. This model has several important advantages:

Worker Power. Workplaces have to be governed and terms and conditions of employment set. The question is who should play what role in that process. One option would be to leave employers in control and allow individual workers to attempt negotiations—in practice, this leaves workers with little voice in decision-making and little capacity to demand change. Another option is to rely on government to establish rules. In this case, workers can attempt to exert influence through the political process, but that influence will be greatly diluted by the myriad other issues unrelated to the workplace that policymakers must address. Workers are likely to disagree on many of those issues, precluding them from operating as an effective bloc when it comes to the economic issues on which their interests most likely align.  
Guaranteeing an environment in which workers are empowered to bargain collectively—and thus on equal footing—with employers is a much better approach. The parties most affected are the ones who will make the decisions, and they can do so with consideration of both their own immediate interests and the long-term interests of both sides in what is ultimately a symbiotic relationship. Bargains struck in this way are likely to prioritize those things which are of highest value to each side, making tradeoffs that are mutually beneficial and thus create economic value in the process. Workers will achieve better outcomes than they could individually, while employers will not perceive every concession as potentially fatal if they are all making it together.

Basis of Competition. By encompassing all competitors in negotiations, broad-based agreements take some areas of potential differentiation off the table and thus channel competitive energies in other directions. If labor relations are standardized, no one can seek to outperform everyone else by squeezing workers harder on wages or skimping on safety, potentially triggering a “race to the bottom.” Conversely, investing in productivity gains, innovation, customer retention, and so forth becomes that much more important.

#### Businesses won’t kill jobs because of higher wages, they benefit from it.

Edward W. Lempinen 23, Writer and Media relations specialist with the UC Berkeley Office of Communications and Public Affairs, UC Berkeley News, “Even in small businesses, minimum wage hikes don’t cause job losses, study finds”, 03/14/23, https://news.berkeley.edu/2023/03/14/even-in-small-businesses-minimum-wage-hikes-dont-cause-job-losses-study-finds/, Accessed: 09/04/25, mcc

Restaurants, retail stores and other small **businesses**, long **thought to be vulnerable to increases in** the minimum **wage, generally do not cut jobs and** may actually **benefit** when governments raise minimum pay, according to a new study co-authored at UC Berkeley.

The prevailing wisdom among many business owners and policymakers is that when the minimum wage rises, smaller low-wage employers suffer more from higher labor costs and are more likely to cut jobs. **But** the groundbreaking new study, co-authored by Berkeley economist Michael Reich, found that small **businesses can pass the costs** on **to consumers with little negative impact.**

“**A** minimum **wage increase doesn’t kill jobs**,” said Reich, chair of UC Berkeley’s Center on Wage and Employment Dynamics (CWED). “It kills job vacancies, not jobs. The higher wage makes it easier to recruit workers and retain them. Turnover rates go down. Other research shows that those workers are likely to be a little more productive, as well.”

### Automation Cyber D---2AC

#### Cyberattacks don’t escalate. Empirics and wargames prove they’re de-escalatory.

Dr. Brandon Valeriano et al. 25, PhD, Lecturer, School of Social & Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. Bren Chair, Military Innovation, Marine Corps University. Senior Advisor, Cyber Solarium Commission. Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; Dr. Ryan C. Maness, PhD, Director, Information Operations for Research, US Department of Defense. Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School; Dr. Benjamin Jensen, PhD, Professor, Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting. Scholar, School of International Service, American University. Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. Former Senior Research Director & Lead Author, US Cyberspace Solarium Commission, "Cyber War," in What Do We Know about War?, Chapter 12, 2025, pg. 221-224.

Escalation is defined as an increase in the nature or intensity of conflict. Extending escalation theory to **cyber space** would include situations in which “the target responds with **more intense** and **costly** cyber means (cyber escalation within the domain) or through **breaching** the cyber-kinetic threshold (crossdomain escalation)” (Borghard and Lonergan 2019: 123). Libicki (2016) simplifies cyber escalation into two factors: intensity (striking deeper, lasting longer) or more extensive (striking new targets), plus adds the consideration that an attack in cyber space can escalate to an attack on physical space.

Cyber escalation is then defined as a reaction with digital tools that increases intensity or aggression or that spreads the scope of conflict after an initial move in the digital domain. Theoretically the cyber domain can contain escalation because of the uncertainty introduced by cyber weapons (Buchanan 2016). There is also the aspect of civilian punishment, attacks that hit what might be deemed off-limits civilian systems, provoking escalation due to the violation in norms between two actors.

In **practice**, however, cyber escalation is **rare**. Stuxnet (2007–2010) is **often cited** as the prime example of cyber escalation yet, put in the context of the wider dispute between the West and Iran over the development of nuclear weapons, the Stuxnet attack is actually a **de-escalatory move** because the other options on the table at the time were **conventional** strikes that would have caused death and destruction.

Talmadge (2019a: 864) makes the point that technology itself is **rarely a sufficient condition** for escalation, “cast[ing] doubt on the idea of **emerging technologies** as an **independent**, primary **driver** of otherwise avoidable escalation.” Technology became the **mask** for the processes that enable escalation, rather than the **cause** of escalation itself. It is not the domain that produces escalation, but the action in the domain that produces outcomes.

We have **ample empirical evidence** that **escalation is limited in the cyber domain**. Even in its simpler form, there is **little retaliation**, let alone escalation, in the domain or even out of the domain when cyber actions are the **triggering** events. When conflicts do escalate in cyber space, we observe **limited engagement** between the parties unless there is **already** an outright war. As Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness (2018: 18) note, “even when cyber exchanges **between rivals** escalate, they remain **limited in scope** outside of ongoing military conflict. That is, rivals may use cyber operations to probe the enemy, test their resolve, and signal the risks of significant escalation.

**Data analysis** supports these positions and is developed here from established data and taken from ongoing projects to support our background investigation into cyber escalation processes (Maness, Valeriano, and Jensen 2019). Table 12.4 shows the **response patterns** between the **U**nited **S**tates and its four major adversaries (**Russia**, **Iran**, **China**, and **No**rth **Ko**rea) in the cyber domain, as well as how each country responds to a cyber operation with a **retaliatory** cyber operation. Table 12.4 utilizes the cyber operation severity score from the DCID version 1.5 that measures the impact and national security importance of each state-initiated cyber operation between the years 2000–2016 between rival states (Maness, Valeriano, and Jensen 2019). The scale is interval and ranges from 1 to 10.

Table 12.4 shows that the United States is often on the receiving end of retaliation at a higher rate than expected. However, these responses to US cyber actions do not indicate within-domain escalation. The severity levels with a response score of 2 were retaliatory to US actions that were of a higher severity level. Of the seven actions at the severity level of 4, three represent a decrease in the initial attack severity and four represent an increase by one tick in severity. The only other country that witnesses a statistically significant level of retaliation at a greater rate than expected is Iran, which is wholly due to US or Israeli operations. China’s significant negative relationship with its severity score of 2 shows that it prefers higher levels of severity when it retaliates in the cyber domain. Many of the Chinese incidents involve entanglements with the United States, which is another great power with vast cyber capabilities. This propensity to use **more severe** attacks does **not** denote escalation, however. Escalation is **rare in digital interactions** as measured by **rival** states from 2000 to 2016.

[Figure omitted]

Table 12.5 shows how responses are related to the overall cyber strategy of the initiating states. In terms of response severity by strategic objective, disruptive efforts by initiating states are usually met with **retaliatory disruptions**, further indicating that the cyber domain is, for the most part, **non-escalatory**. Espionage campaigns are also commonly met with cyber operations that either steal or signal capabilities or displeasure for the originating action, but do not lead to a **tit-for-tat** escalatory ladder, as indicated in Table 12.2. Only occasionally do we see disruptions or espionage operations escalate to the severity level of 5, with this happening only five times over the 2000–2016 period.

Results from **war games** have demonstrated the **complicated** empirical picture of the escalation landscape in cyber space (Schneider 2017). After examining war games from 2011 to 2016, Schneider finds that government officials were **hesitant** to use damaging cyber weapons. Most games only witness the use of cyber capabilities after the onset of conventional warfare, not before. For Jensen and Banks (2018), in the context of cyber options, escalation was the **exception, not the norm**.

To explore escalation when cyber options are present within the context of integrated options of national power, Jensen and Valeriano (2019) ran a series of war games on 259 participants, including members of the military, students, and policymakers. The simulation situated participants in a typical crisis that was **highly likely** to escalate given a **rivalry** situation over an **ongoing territorial dispute** when the crisis under examination was the third in a series over a five-year period.

The results **demonstrated** that escalation is not the norm. Based on a general baseline for all international conflict situations, most options fell below the 48 percent threshold. In fact, the only instance where escalation was the dominant option was when a cyber action started the crisis and the target had no cyber response options. This suggests there are implications of attacking a state with cyber options when they do not have the ability to respond within the domain. In **most** other situations, we witness **few demands for escalation** when cyber response options are on the table.

Overall, **regardless of the situation**, cyber escalation is usually **not** the dominant response. The reality is that even under dangerous conditions cyber response options can **actually moderate** crisis response patterns. Surveys demonstrate a great amount of **fear** in the cyber domain, but this **does not motivate overreaction** (Gross, Canetti, and Vashdi 2017). Figure 12.2 shows the results from a cyber campaign–directed dyads data set. What is measured in what follows is whether the combined cyber operation, which includes diplomatic, economic, and military variables extracted from ICEWS (Boschee et al. 2018), has escalatory responses from the target from all four domains recorded in the campaigns. For a cyber response to be recorded, the target responds within one year from the start date of the original cyber operation from the initiator for disruptions and degradations, and from the date the operation becomes public for espionage operations. For a diplomatic response, the time frame is one month (thirty days) after the cyber operation’s initiation or public reporting, and for economic and military responses, the time frame is three months (ninety days) after the same criteria regarding the cyber operation. For cyber escalation, the severity score must go up at least one point regarding the cyber response. No cyber responses at the same severity score are included. For conventional responses, we use the Conflict and Mediation Event Observation (CAMEO) conflict-cooperation scores to measure escalation (Schrodt 2012). The CAMEO scale ranges from −10 to 10 where the more negative score, the more conflictual and the more positive score, the more cooperative the foreign policy action. If the conflict scores from each domain are lower (more negative) from the target state in retaliation for the cyber incident, escalation in each domain is recorded.